Abstmct-Seqmntial strategies for dynamic systems with multiple deeision makers 
J, ( T I (u2)
where TI is a mapping from u2 to ul, u:* is the leader Stackelberg strategy, and u:*= T,(u:*) is the follower Stackelberg strategy.
In comparison, a Nash strategy pair ( U~~, U~~) , whch may not be unique, is defined by reaction behavior of the follower is known to the leader who optimizes his choice of control ul.
Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategies for Dynamic Games
Consider a dynamic system =f ( x , u,, 4
( 1 1) where x E R is the state, u1 E R ml and u2 E Rm2 are the controls, and f is a piecewise continuous function from R" X R m 1 X Rm2 to R". In the dynamic system case, it is necessary to specify what type of information is available to each player. Suppose no state measurements are available. In this case we consider open-loop strategies. The open-loop strategy for the leader for the entire duration of the game is declared in advance. If the follower minimizes his cost function, he obtains his follower Stackelberg strategy which is the optimal reaction to the declared leader strategy. By declaring his strategy in advance, the leader influences the follower to react in a manner which, of course, minimizes the follower's cost function, but more importantly, in a manner which is favorable to the leader. This is a direct interpretation of the definition of the leader's strategy in (2) . Similarly, for closed-loop strategies where the state is available for measurement, the leader has to declare his control law for the entire duration of the game.
In situations where either player might be a leader, both cases should be examined because both players may insist on leader strategies in which case there may be disequilibrium, or both may play follower strategies and a stalemate may occur [5] . The stability of these disequilibrium strategies has been examined by Okuguchi
One of the disadvantages of using Stackelberg strategies is that for the leader the principle of optimality does not hold, and hence dynamic programming cannot be applied. for closed-loop Stackelberg strategies. The leader-follower solution concept assumes a commitment by the leader to implement his announced strategy. This commitment is for a game over the interval [to,$] . If the actual interval were different, the committed strategy generally would not coincide with the Stackelberg strategy for the new interval, but the leader would be obliged to use the nonoptimal strategy.
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Feedback Stackelberg Strategy
A modification of the Stackelberg strategy concept which requires that the strategies for the remaining time-to-go after each stage should be optimal in the extended Stackelberg sense to be defined is presented in [4] . We briefly review this extended strategy here. We consider a multistage discrete-time game where state measurements are available to both players.
To distinguish the extended strategy from the closed-loop Stackelberg strategy, it is called feedback Stackelberg strategy. Other information structures may be considered, and to distinguish the extended Stackelberg strategy from the basic one, it is called equilibrium Stackelberg strategy [7] .
Consider a discrete-time system where x(j)ER", uICj)ERml, u2Cj)ERmz for j = O , . . -, N -1. A cost functional
is associated with each player i, for i = 1, 2, where ui = { u,(k),. -* , u,(N -1)). Suppose that Player 1 is the leader.
Denote the feedback Stackelberg strategies, with Player 1 as leader, for a game starting at time k, by u:, and u&.
These are sequences of functions of the state at each stage from time k to time N -1. Denote the resulting cost functions using these feedback Stackelberg controls by y[x(k), k]. A key defining property of feedback Stackelberg strategies is that if utl is a feedback Stackelberg strategy for a game starting at time k and ending at time N , then the continuation of starting from time k + 1 is a feedback Stackelberg strategy uL,+ for a game starting at time k + 1 and ending at time N . Thus, for a game starting at time k , we consider only those control sequences whose continuations are u,",+' . The resulting cost functions are
If there are no constraints on the controls, we have the following necessary conditions: and af' a v; au2(k) ax(k+ 1)
The boundary conditions for (25) and (26) are
From the definition, the optimality of the feedback Stackelberg strategy does not depend on the number of stages in the game. Continuations of feedback Stackelberg strategies are optimal in the feedback Stackelberg sense for any number of remaining stages. On the other hand, the Stackelberg strategy, open-loop or closed-loop, is tuned to a specific number of stages and to a specific starting time. For such a fixed interval and fixed starting time, the leader's cost corresponding to a feedback Stackelberg strategy may not be as low as that corresponding to the closed-loop Stackelberg strategy. However, the leader's cost associated with remaining stages-to-go corresponding to the closed-loop Stackelberg strategy may be higher than that corresponding to the feedback Stackelberg strategy. This is because the continuation of the original closed-loop strategy is generally not a closed-loop Stackelberg strategy for the remaining stages-to-go. In contrast, for the last stage, the feedback Stackelberg strategy is also the optimal closed-loop strategy for a one-stage game. The feedback Stackelberg strategy for the next to the last stage is chosen under the constraint that the strategy for the last stage is a feedback Stackelberg strategy. The feedback control law is computed backward in time in this fashion, as indicated in (25), (26), and (27) .
The application of the Stackelberg concept to the cost function in (24) is not the only way we can define a feedback Stackelberg strategy. Suppose that the number of stages is even. Then we might consider that the continuation of any strategy two stages later has the same optimality property in the sense to be defined by the feedback Stackelberg strategy. That is, if u l l is a feedback Stackelberg strategy, we might want to constrain the admissible control strategies so that the continuation two stages later is equal to u,",+,, which is the feedback Stackelberg strategy for a game starting at k + 2. The resulting cost function to be optimized is
(28) Thus, J, is to be minimized with respect to u2(k) and u,(k+ l), and J, is to be minimized with respect to u,(k) and u,(k + 1) subject to the constraint that J , is minimized with respect to u2(k) and u,(k+ 1). The resulting control law would be different from the previously defined feedback Stackelberg strategy. To differentiate these different feedback concepts, we call the previous one Type 1 feedback Stackelberg and the second one Type 2 feedback Stackelberg. Type n feedback Stackelberg strategies may be similarly considered. For a conventional optimal control problem, all these types yield the same control and they are obtainable by dynamic programming and the principle of optimality. It does not matter whether we minimize a cost function such as in (24) 
COORDINATION OF INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS

Basic Coordination Concept
Let us consider the basic concept of coordination in a static system with two decision makers, each with a scalar performance index, and each controlling a separate variable uI and u2, respectively. Let us suppose that each of the two scalar performance indices is also affected by a third variable uo which is chosen by a third decision maker called the coordinator. Denote these scalar performance indices by Jl(uO,ul,uJ and J2(u0, ul,uJ. For each value of u,, the controls uI and u2 are chosen according to a game solution concept appropriate for a particular situation. For example, if uI and u2 are chosen as Nash equilibrium solutions,
where uI = T,(uo) and u2= T2(u0) are Nash solutions for the given u,. The coordinator chooses a value for uo such that a scalar performance index Jo(uo,ul,uJ is minimized subject to the condition that u1 = Tl(uo) and u2 = T2(u0). Thus, the coordinator acts as the leader and the two other decision makers act as followers in the Stackelberg sense. The coordinator chooses u; such that
for all uo in the admissible set.
The coordinator performance index could represent a composite function reflecting the welfare of the entire system. For example, the index J , might be a convex linear combination of J , and J2:
J o ( u , , u 1 ,~2 ) =~1 J , (uo,uI,u2)+"2J2(uo,uI,u2) where a,>O, a,>0, and a1+a2=1.
In this case, uI and u2 might be chosen as Nash equilibrium solutions when the two decision makers cannot be guaranteed to cooperate. However, the introduction of a coordinator which chooses a third control variable enforces a restricted Pareto optimality in the sense that
aIJ1 (~o s , u S , u~) +~2 J 2 (~~, u S , u~) G a l J I (~o ,~I ,~2 ) +~2 J 2 (~0 ,~1 ,~2 )
for all admissible uo,ul,u2. However, in the case of the Stackelberg coordination of the Nash decision makers, the allowed controls for u1 and u2 are Tl(uo) and T2(u0) for all ug. Without coordination, the variable uo is assumed to take a nominal value Go. With coordination, uo is chosen as u;. Thus, in cases where the controls u1 and u2 have to be chosen without cooperation, a limited type of Pareto optimality can still be achieved by introducing a coordinator.
We consider a linear stochastic discrete-time system with one coordinator at the first level and M decision makers at the second level. For simplicity, we take M = 2 . The system is represented by
where x ( k ) E R is the state, uo(k) E R mo is the control of the coordinator, u'(k) E Rml and u2(k) E Rm2 are the controls of the two decision makers at the second level, and u(k) is a vector noise disturbance. The quantities x(0) and u ( k ) are Gaussian random vectors with zero mean and covariance P ( 0 ) and A(k), and the measurement of each decision maker is
where ('(k) is a Gaussian random vector with zero mean and covariance Z ( k ) . It is assumed that x(O), c(k), and ( ' ( k ) are mutually independent. The cost function for each i is
Ji(ui)=ix'(N)Ki(N)x(N)
The matrices A(k), B'(k), H'(k), K ' ( N ) , Q'(k), and R ' ( k ) are known to all decision makers. It is assumed that R' and K' are positive definite and Q' is positive semi-definite. The problem of finding the feedback Stackelberg strategy for the two-level hierarchy where Decision Makers 1 and 2 play Nash between themselves was recently considered for several information structures by Glankwamdee and Cruz [15] . In this section we summarize some of these results.
k = O
Perfect Information
Here it is assumed that all decision makers have perfect knowledge of the state through their measurements
We seek coordinator strategies which are functions of the state, and follower strategies which are functions of the state and the coordinator control strategy. Denote the resulting expected cost-to-go at stage k by
for some deterministic matrix S'(k) and scalar function y ' ( k ) when feedback Stackelberg strategies are applied.
Using the solution concept of Type 1 feedback Stackelberg strategy discussed in the previous section, we have
For a given feedback control law for the coordinator, the two minimizations in (34) define the Nash game between Decision Makers 1 and 2. Substituting the expression from (33) with k replaced by k + 1 into (34) and using the state equation in (29), the minimizations yield expressions for u'(k) and u2(k) in terms of
(35)
For the coordinator we have
Before performing the minimization in (36), we express V o ( k + 1) in terms of So(k+ 1) and yo(k + 1) from (33), the state equation of (29), and the follower control laws from (35). The resulting minimization results in a coordinator control law of the form [15] The matrix gains Lo(k) and k ( k ) are computed from a set of recursive equations backward in time starting with k = N -1. The coordinator's control law, i.e., Lo(k), is known in advance to all the M second-level decision makers. The recursive equations are
Equations (38H44) are solved in the sequence presented starting with k = N -1 with boundary conditions
The calculations are repeated for k = N -2, k = N -3, and so forth, until the specified initial time is reached. The y ' ( k ) in the cost function are obtained from the following:
As in the two-person game discussed in the previous section, the feedback Stackelberg strategy for coordination is an equilibrium strategy in the sense that the continuation strate0 after one stage is an optimal feedback Stackelberg strategy for the remainder of the game.
Similar solutions are obtainable for another special information structure, namely, when z'(k)= z2(k) and the coordinator's measurement consists of at least z'(k). This nested information structure includes three subcases: 1) when the lower level decision makers have identical noisy measurements and the coordinator has perfect knowledge of the state; 2) when the lower level decision makers have no measurements and the coordinator has some measurement; and 3) when all measurements are identical. For this nested information structure case, and using the feedback Stackelberg concept, the optimal cost functions for the lower level subsystems can be expressed as a quadratic form in the conditional expectation of the state, given the measurement of the lower level subsystem, plus a term analogous to y ' ( k ) in the perfect measurement case. For the coordinator, the optimal cost function is expressible as a quadratic form in the conditional expectation of the state, given the coordmator's measurement, and in the difference between the two conditional expectations, given the two different measurements, plus a term analogous to yo(k). The lower level controls are linear in the conditional expectation of the state given their measurement, and linear in the given coordinator control. The gain matrices are identical to those for perfect measurement so that a separation principle applies to the lower level decision makers. The coordinator control is linear in the two conditional expectations of the state. These conditional expectations are obtained from Kalman
filters. The procedure is analogous to that presented in [8] .
Details of the recursive equations and their derivation are given in [ 151.
Nonnested Information Structure
When the leader does not know all the measurements of the second-level decision makers and/or when the second-level decision makers do not have the same measurement, it is extremely difficult to formulate an optimum feedback Stackelberg problem. However, when the structure of the individual control laws is specified, e.g., when it is constrained to be linear, necessary conditions can be derived. We consider control laws of the form where F'(k) is to be determined so that the control law is feedback Stackelberg. Necessary conditions for the determination of F'(k) have been derived in [ 151. Using the control (48) where z'(k) is given in (30), and defining
It is assumed that P(0) is given. Given a set of feedback matrix sequences {F' (j)}, the second level cost-to-go expressions may be written as 
+B1(k)F'(k)H1(k)-tB2(k)F2(k)H2(k)]'
In accordance with the feedback Stackelberg concept, we consider strategies whose continuations after one stage are feedback Stackelberg strategies for the remaining stages. Thus, we write
where E {J'(k + 1)) is obtained from (51) with k replaced by k + l , and { F ' ( j ) } from j = k + l to j = N are the feedback Stackelberg matrices. Then E { J ' ( k ) } is minimized with respect to F'(k) and E { J 2 ( k ) } is minimized with respect to F2(k). These minimizations yield expressions for F'(k) and F2(k) in terms of Fo(k) and the other matrices that appear in (51). These matrices F'(k) and F2(k) are substituted in (57) for i=O and the resulting expression for E {Jo(k)} is minimized with respect to Fo(k). This yields an expression for Fo(k) in terms of the matrices appearing in (57) and (51) except F'(k) and F2(k). Combining these equations, we can obtain coupled difference equations in Si(,%), for i=O, 1,2, and P(k), with boundary conditions P(0) and S ' ( N ) . Thus, the feedback Stackelberg matrices F'(k) are expressed in terms of solutions of a two-point boundary value problem. We note that even in the case of a standard stochastic optimal control problem where the control law is constrained to be a linear function of the measurement, as in (48), a two-point boundary value problem arises [ 181. The game problem cannot be expected to be simpler. Details of the two-point boundary value problem are in [15] .
The resulting feedback Stackelberg matrices {F'(k), k = O , l , . . . , N -l ; i=O,I,2} are functions of
where m, is the mean of x(0) and cov [x(O)] is the covariance of x(0). Thus, these feedback matrix sequences are based on data at the start of the game, k=O. Since measurements are obtained at each sampling instant, updated estimates of P ( k ) might be available. For example, suppose that at time k = r, there is a new estimate of P ( r ) . A new set of feedback Stackelberg matrices { F'(k), k = r, r + 1,. . . , N -1 ; i = 0,1,2} could be computed. These new sequences are functions of P ( r ) . In principle, an updated set of feedback Stackelberg sequences for the remaining stages-to-go could be considered at each stage r when a new estimate of P ( r ) is available.
The method described above may be extended to dynamic output feedback controllers of specified order. R e p resent the ith subsystem controller by
in this section. We model the interconnected system by i=f(x,ui; i=O, 1;. * ,m), x(to)=xo (60) where x E R is the state, uj E R nz is the control of the ith decision maker, and the cost function for each decision maker is
The index i = O corresponds to the coordmator. The time instants to and tf are fixed. State measurements are made at r discrete instants of time {ti E [to, tf), i = O,l,. , r -1 }.
The controls are allowed to be functions of time f and the latest state measurement. Thus, for all i, uj= ui(r,x(tj)), for $ 9 r < tj+ I . Before time to, the coordinator announces h~s control law u,(t,r;i.> for f~ [tj,tf] , forj=O, I;. -, r -1. The second-level declslon makers take this given coordinator strategy into account in computing their individual sampled data strategy based on a Nash solution concept among themselves. The leader, talung into account the reaction strategies of all the second-level decision makers, determines a sampled data strategy to minimize his own cost function, subject to the constraint that the remaining strategy starting from the next sampling instant is also optimal in the feedback Stackelberg sense. This permits us to relate the optimum cost-to-go, in the feedback Stackelberg sense, at any sampling time $ to the optimal costto-go at sampling time Let the sampled data feedback Stackelberg costs to go at time $ be denoted by are to be found so that the controls are optimal in the feedback Stackelberg sense. For si=O, the problem is identical to the one considered previously. By augmenting the state space and by augmenting the measurement z i with wi, the problem may be transformed to the same type considered previously. Details are given in [ 151. where the followers play a Nash game among themselves [6] . The problem is much more complex, however, because V,(x,+ I , $ + l ) is also to be determined. The sampled-data feedback Stackelberg concept is similar to the feedback Stackelberg concept for discrete systems in the sense that y.(x,,tj) is related to V,(xj+ as in (62) or (28). However, for the sampled data case, an open-loop control time function between sampling times is required. The usual dynamic programming approach is not applica-ble to such problems, but a variational method can be used.
For each second-level decision maker define a Hamiltonian H;(x,~;,u~;~~,u,)=L~(x,u~; k=O,l,-..,m) +pif (x,uk; k=0,1,---,m) . ( for each decision maker Pi. P , is the follower at the bottom of the linear hierarchy. He knows the controls u2 and uj of the other decision makers. P2 is the middle who knows u3, but he knows that P I reacts according to declared functions u2 and u,. P, is the leader who knows that P2 reacts according to his declared control u3, and who takes into account the reaction of P, to declared controls u2 and 24,. Necessary conditions for this problem are derived in [lo] . For P , the necessary conditions are (74)
P I = -Q~x -A ' P I~ P I ( T ) = F I X ( T )
and O= R , , u l + B~p l .
Assuming that R I I is positive definite, control u1 may be expressed as
Notice that the controls u2 and u3 influence the costate nj= Pix, i = 1,2,3
vectorpl and, hence, u1 depends on u2 and 24,. Substitutw = w x (94) ing ( 
P~( T ) = F~x ( T ) -F I~I ( T )
(8 1) k l = -S 2 1 p I + S l p 2 + A n , , n , ( t , ) = O
and assuming that R , is positive definite,
Substituting 2 4 , from (83) in ( In [lo] it is shown that the two-point boundary value problem can be converted to a higher order matrix Riccati differential equation with a given terminal condition. The coefficient matrices of this higher order Riccati equation do not possess the symmetry and positive semi-definiteness of usual optimal control problems. However, in [IO] it is shown that if the 4n x 4 n solution of the Riccati equation is partitioned into four 2n X 2n matrices, the block off-diagonal matrices are symmetric and the block diagonal matrices are transposes of each other. Furthermore, if a solution exists, then the block off-diagonal matrices are positive semidefinite.
Closed-Loop Multilecel Stackelberg Strategies
~= A x -S~~~-S~P~+ B , U , , S2=B2RS1B;, x (~, ) = x , The determination of necessary conditions for optimal-
. ity in the closed-loop Stackelberg sense is very difficult, (84) even for linearquadratic problems. In r121, linear closedEquation (77) represents the reaction of PI to a given u2 loop Stackelberg strategies are consideied for linear systems with quadratic cost functions, where it is shown that and u3' and (81) and (82) represent the reaction Of p2 to the optimal closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for such using the reactions of P I and P,. Substituting the controls uI from (78) and u2 from (83) (loo)
The initial state x, is assumed to be random with zero mean and unity covariance matrix. The new cost function is
The linear (104)
With L , chosen as in (105), minimization of y2 with respect to L, with the constraints (102) and (99) for i = 2 yields a set of matrix Riccati-type differential equations and one algebraic matrix equation which is linear in L,.
Finally, we minimize y3 with respect to L, subject to the constraints (99) for i = 3, (102), (103), (105), and the add& tional Riccati-type equations from the minimization of J2 with respect to &. This yields more Riccati-type differential equations and one algebraic matrix equation which is linear in &. Thus, a large set of matrix Riccati type differential equations must be solved with boundary conditions at t = to and t = T. These necessary conditions have been derived in [12] . When the matrices in (74) and (75) are time-invariant and when T-xQ, these differential equations are replaced by algebraic equations which are obtained by deleting the time derivative tenns. An algorithm for this problem is suggested in [12] .
Feedback MultiIeveI Stackelberg Strategies
Consider the linear discrete-time system
i= 1 The cost function for each decision maker is The matrix product notation used above is defined by as the Nash equilibrium treated in the paper. [13] that effective algorithms from this class can be developed. The primary objective of the present paper is to motivate and explore some specific state estimation algorithms for the case in which information exchange is permitted over noisy communication channels.
After identifying the class of systems under consideration and the relevant assumptions being employed, two singular information patterns which can be used to bound the performance improvement attainable through information exchange are discussed in Section 11. It is shown that the information exchange residing in the subsystem interaction measurements can be used to obtain effective local filters. Interaction measurement of noise crossover levels which provide a measure of effectiveness of the interaction measurements are introduced and a theorem is presented which suggests an algorithm for computing these levels. The results of Section I1 are then used in Section I11 to motivate two specific structures having infomation exchange and a numerical example illustrating the performance capability of the resulting algorithms is presented.
Consider a system which can be modeled as a given collection {Si : i = 1,2,. 
